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Navigating the Patent Thicket: CrossLicenses,
Patent Pools, and Standard Setting
Carl Shapiro, University of Ca4forniaat Berkeley
Executive Summary
In several key industries, including semiconductors,biotechnology, computer
software, and the Internet, our patentsystem is creating a patent thicket: an
overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seekingto commercialize
new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees. Thepatent thicket is
especially thorny when combined with the risk of holdup,namely the danger
that new products will inadvertently infringeon patents issued after these
products were designed. The need to navigate thepatent thicket and holdup is
especially pronounced in industries suchas telecommunications and comput-
ing in which formal standard setting isa core part of bringing new technologies
to market. Cross licenses and patent poolsare two natural and effective meth-
ods used by market participants to cut through thepatent thicket, but each in-
volves some transaction costs. Antitrust lawand enforcement, with its
historical hostility to cooperationamong horizontal rivals, can easily add to
these transaction costs. Yet a few relatively simpleprinciples, such as the desir-
ability package licensing for complementarypatents but not for substitute pat-
ents, can go a long way toward insuring that antitrustwill help solve the
problems caused by the patent thicket and by holduprather than exacerbating
them.
I.The Patent Thicket
Is our patent system slowing down thecommercialization of new
technologies?
The essence of science is cumulativeinvestigation combined with
hypothesis testing. The notion of cumulativeinnovation, each discov-
ery building on many previous findings, is centralto the scientific
method. Indeed, no respectable scientist wouldfail to recognize and
acknowledge the crucial role played by hisor her predecessors in es-
tablishing a foundation from whichprogress could be made. As SirShapiro
120
Isaac Newton put it, each scientist "stands onthe shoulders of giants"
to reach new heights.
Today, most basic and applied researchers areeffectively standing on
top of a huge pyramid, not just on oneset of shoulders. Of course, a
pyramid can rise to far greater heights thancould any one person, es-
pecially if the foundation is strong and broad.But what happens if, in
order to scale the pyramid and place a newblock on the top, a research-
er must gain the permissionof each person who previously placed a
block in the pyramid, perhaps paying aroyalty or tax to gain such per-
mission? Would this system of intellectual propertyrights slow down
the construction of the pyramid or limit itsheight?
Clearly, pyramid building, namelyresearch and development
(R&D), is taking place at an impressive pacetoday, so there is no great
cause for alarm, especially inthe area of basic research where the "roy-
alty" is often (but not always) nothing morethan a citation. As we
move from pure R to appliedR and ultimately to D, however, one can
fairly ask whether our legal and commercialinstitutions are in fact
properly designed to promote rather thandiscourage the creation of
products and services that draw on manystrands of innovation and
thus potentially require licenses from multiplepatent holders. To com-
plete the analogy, blocking patents play therole of the pyramid's build-
ing blocks.
Mixing metaphors, thoughtful observers areincreasingly expressing
concerns that our patent(and copyright) system is in fact creating a
patent thicket, a dense web of overlappingintellectual property rights
that a company must hack its way through inorder to actually com-
mercialize new technology. With cumulativeinnovation and multiple
blocking patents, stronger patent rights canhave the perverse effect of
stifling, not encouraging, innovation.1
In fact, even while a consensus hasemerged that innovation is the
main driver of economic growth, we arewitnessing somewhat of a
backlash against the patent system as it iscurrently operating. Espe-
ciallyunpopulararepatents on businessmethods, such as
Priceline.com's patent on "buyer-drivenconditional purchase offers"
(asserted against Microsoft) or Amazon's patent on a oneclick online
shopping system (asserted against Barnes &Noble). The Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) does indeed seem to haveallowed a number
of patents on ideas that would not appearoffhand to meet the usual
standards for novelty and nonobviousness, such asthe patent held by
Sightsound.com which reputedly covers "thesale of audio or video re-Navigating the Patent Thicket
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cordings in download fashionover the Internet." Emboldened bya key
appeals court decision in 1998supporting a patent fora business
method enabled by computersoftware, patent applications forcom-
puter-related business methods havejumped from about 1,000 in 1997
to over 2,500 in 1999. In an attemptto call a truce in what could other-
wise prove to be a mutuallydestructive patent battle, Jeff Bezos,the
Chairman of Amazon.com, recentlysuggested that patents on software
and Internet business methodsbe limited to 3 or 5years, rather than
the usual 20 years from the date ofapplication.2
But concerns about a patent thicket,and excessively loose standards
at the PTO, are hardly confinedto e-commerce and business method
patents. For example, in thesemiconductor industry, companiessuch
as IBM, Intel, or Motorola find it all tooeasy to unintentionally infringe
on a patent in designing a microprocessor,potentially exposing them-
selves to billions of dollars ofliability and/oran injunction forcing
them to cease production ofkey products.3 So-called submarinepat-
ents, that take years if not decadesto work their way through the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office,are another great source of anxiety
especially for large manufacturingfirms. Plus, more andmore compa-
nies are following the lead of TexasInstruments and engaging in patent
mining, trying to get themost out of their patents by assertingthem
more aggressively than ever againstpossible infringing firms,even
those who are not rivals. Andconsiderable research shows thatcompa-
nies are increasingly inclinedto seek patents, causingan increase in the
propensity to patent, as wellas an increase in the practice of defensive
patenting.4
In short, our patent system, whilesurely a spur to innovationover-
all, is in danger of imposingan unnecessary drag on innovation byen-
abling multiple rightsowners to "tax" new products,processes, and
even business methods. The vast numberof patents currently being is-
sued creates a very real dangerthat a single productor service will in-
fringe on many patents. Worseyet, many patents cover productsor
processes already being widely used when thepatent is issued, making
it harder for the companies actuallybuilding businesses andmanufac-
turing products to invent aroundthese patents. Add in the factthat a
patent holder can seek injunctive relief,that is, can threaten to shut
down the operations of the infringingcompany, and the possibility for
holdup becomes all too real.
This paper takes as given the floodof patents currently being issued
by the PTO, andassumes that these patents are indeedcreating a122
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patent thicket in the sensethat many new productswould likely in-
fringe on multiple patents.Remaining agnostic (butsuspicious) about
whether the PTO is too lax in grantingpatents (especially softwarepat-
ents), or whether the courts are toogenerous in upholdingpatents that
are granted, I look atthe business arrangementsthat are being used to
cut through the patentthicket.
More specifically, I considerthe evolving and growing roleof cross li-
censes and patentpools to solve the complementsproblem that arises
when multiple patent holders canpotentially block a given product.I
discuss specifically thestandard setting process, thatincreasingly in-
volves complex negotiations overpatent rights and licensing terms.I
also consider other ways inwhich companies resolve disputes overin-
tellectual property, includingacquisitions.
For each business practice, inaddition to describing theeconomics
underlying that practice andexamples of its use, I considerwhether
antitrust limits are contributing tothe problems caused bythe patent
system. Unfortunately, antitrustenforcement and antitrust lawhave a
deep rooted suspicion ofcooperative activities involvingdirect com-
petitors. But such cooperation1 in oneform or another, may beprecisely
what is required to navigatethe patent thicket. As a result,unless anti-
trust law and enforcement arequite sensitive to the problemsposed by
the patent thicket, they canhave the perverse effect of slowingdown
the commercialization of newdiscoveries and ultimatelyretarding in-
novation, precisely the oppositeof the intent of both the patentlaws
and the antitrust laws.
II.Market Responses to OverlappingPatents
The Economic Theory ofComplements
The generic problem inherent inthe patent thicket is wellunderstood
as a matter ofeconomic theory, at least in itsstatic version. Consider,
for example, a company seeking tomanufacture a new graphics chip
for use in personal computers orvideo game consoles. (Substitute a
biotech firm using patented toolsfor genetic engineering, or an e-com-
merce firm usingpatented business methods, if youwould prefer.)
Suppose that the company'spreferred design for this chip islikely to
infringe on a number of patents;the process manufacturingmethods
used to actually produce thechip infringe on a numberof additionalNavigating the Patent Thicket
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patents. In order to produce the chipas designed, the company needs
to obtain licenses from a number, call it N,of separate rights holders.
This situation is precisely the classiccomplements problem origi-
nally studied by Cournot in 1838.Cournot considered the problem
faced by a manufacturer of brass whohad to purchase two key inputs,
copper and zinc, each controlled by a monopolist.5 AsCournot demon-
strated, the resulting price of brasswas higher than would arise if a sin-
gle firm controlled trade in bothcopper and zinc, and sold these inputs
to a competitive brass industry (or made thebrass itself). Worse yet, the
combined profits of the producerswere lower as well in the presence of
complementary monopolies. So, the sadresult of the balkanized rights
to copper and zinc was to harm bothconsumers and producers.6 The
same applies today when multiple companies controlblocking patents
for a particular product,process, or business method.
How can the inefficiency associated withmultiple blocking patents
be eliminated? One natural andattractive solution is for the copper and
zinc suppliers to join forces and offertheir inputs for a single, package
price to the brass industry. The twomonopolist suppliers will find it in
their joint interest to offer a package price thatis less than these two com-
ponents sold for when priced separately. The blockingpatent version of
this principle is that the rights holderswill find it attractive to createa
package license or patent pool,or in some situations to simply engage
in cross licensing so theycan each produce final products themselves.
The appendix offers a short, modern,and more general version of
Cournot's theory of complementscast in terms of blocking patents.
This basic theory of complements (usedin fixed proportions) gives
strong support for businesses to adopt, and forcompetition authorities
to welcome, either cross licensees, packagelicenses, or patent pools to
clear such blocking positions. Iftwo patent holders are the onlycompa-
nies realistically capable of manufacturingproducts that utilize their
intellectual property rights,a royalty-free cross license is ideal from the
point of view of ex post competition. Butany cross license is superior to
a world in which the patents holders fail tocooperate, since neither
could proceed with actual production andsale in that world without
infringing on the other's patents. Alternatively,if the two patent hold-
ers see benefits from enabling many others to makeproducts that uti-
lize their intellectual property rights,a patent pool, under which all the
blocking patents are licensed ina coordinated fashion as a package, can
be an ideal outcome. The simple theory,which is sketched out in the124
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appendix, suggests that coordinatingsuch licensing can lead to lower
royalty rates than would independentpricing (licensing) of the two
companies' patents.
In other words, without crosslicenses or patent pools, there is a ten-
dency for products to bearmultiple patent burdens. The buildupof li-
censing fees can have severalunattractive consequences. First,the
well-known costs of static monopoly power aremagnified: prices are
well above marginal costs, causinginefficiently low use of these prod-
ucts. As shown in theappendix, with N rights holders,equilibrium
markups are N times the monopolylevel. Of course, this is merely a
magnified version of the monopolyburden resulting from the patent
system itself, but it is well toremember Cournot's lesson that themulti-
ple burdens reduce both consumerwelfare and the profits of patentees
in comparison with acoordinated licensing approach. Second,these
burdens may cause certain products not tobe produced at all, if that
production is subject to economiesof scale. Third (this is a dynamic
version of the previous point), theprospect of paying such royalties
necessarily reduces the return to newproduct design and develop-
ment, and thus can easily be adrag on innovation and commercializa-
tion of new technologies.
Heller and Eisenberg (1998) discussthe complements problem in the
context of biotechnology patents,making a nice comparison to the clas-
sic tragedy of the commons. Thewell-known tragedy of the commons
refers to the fact that a resource canbe overused if it is not protected by
property rights; fishing groundsand clean water are standard exam-
ples. Heller and Eisenberg point outthat quite a different problem
arises when there are multipleblocking patents; they label thisproblem
the tragedy of the anti-commons.The tragedy of the anti-commons
arises when there are multiplegatekeepers, each of whom must grant
permission before a resource can beused. With such excessive property
rights, the resource is likely to beunderused. In the case of patents, in-
novation is stifled.
The Holdup Problem
As noted above, the complementsproblem is at its worst when the
downstream firms using the variousinputs truly require each input to
make their products. In the patentcontext, if a manufacturer finds it
relatively easy to design around a givenpatent, the royalties that the
patentee can assert arenecessarily limited. So, unless the patentinNavigating the Patent Thicket
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question is quite broad,one might think that any burdenon the manu-
facturer would be modest, andarguably the very returnwe wish to
provide to the patenteeas a reward for innovation.
Unfortunately, this rather romanticview of patents is less and less
applicable in our economy, for threereasons. First, even a modest tax is
counterproductive if the patentwas improperly granted, that is, if the
patentee did not truly madea new and useful discovery, or if thepatent
as granted was too broad, coveringsome prior art as well as something
truly new. Second, the cumulativeeffect of many small taxescan be-
come quite large; there are soundreasons to believe that the static
deadweight loss associated withthese royalties is increasingand con-
vex in the tax rate, at least oversome range of royalties. The danger of
paying royalties to multiple patentowners is hardly a theoretical curi-
osity in industries suchas semiconductors in which many thousandsof
patents are issued each year andmanufacturers can potentially in-
fringe on hundreds of patents witha single product.
Third, and most important, istiming. Suppose thatour repre-
sentative manufacturer could, withease, invent around a given patent,
if that manufacturerwere aware of the patent and afforded sufficient
lead time. Clearly, in thiscase the patented technology contributes little
if anything to the final product,and any reasonable royalty wouldbe
modest at best. But, oh, how thesituation changes if the manufacturer
has already designed its product andplaced it into large scale produc-
tion before the patent issues. Inthis case, even though thetiming is
strongly suggestive that themanufacturer did not in fact relyon the
patented invention for the design ofits product, the manufactureris in
a far weaker negotiating position. Thepatentee can credibly seek far
greater royalties, very likely backedup with the threat of shutting
down the manufacturer if the Courtindeed finds the patent valid and
infringed and grants injunctiverelief. The manufacturer couldgo back
and redesign its product, butto do so (a) could well requirea major re-
design effort and/orcause a significant disruption to production,(b)
would still leave potential liabilityfor any products sold after thepat-
ent issued before the redesigned productsare available for sale, and (c)
could present compatibility problemswith other productsor between
different versions of this product. Inother words, for all of theserea-
sons, the manufacturer is highly susceptibleto holdup by the patentee.
I submit that this holdup problemis very real today, and that bothpat-
ent and antitrust policymakers shouldregard holdup as a problem of
first order significance in theyears ahead.126
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The holdup problem is worstin industries where hundredsif not
thousands of patents, some alreadyissued, others pending, can poten-
tially read on a given product.In these industries, the dangerthat a
manufacturer will step on a land mineis all too real. The result willbe
that some companies avoidthe mine field altogether, thatis, refrain
from introducing certain productsfor fear of holdup. Other companies
will lose their corporate legs,that is, will be forced to payroyalties on
patents that they couldeasily have invented around at anearlier stage,
had they merely been awarethat such a patent eitherexisted or was
pending. Of course, ultimatelythe expected value of theseroyalties
must be reflected in the priceof final goods.
In short, with multiple overlappingpatents, and under a system in
which patent applications are secretand patents slow to issue (relative
to the speed of newproduct introduction), we have avolatile mix of
two powerful types oftransaction costs that can burdeninnovation: (1)
the complements problem,the solution of which requirescoordination,
perhaps large scale coordination;and (2) the holdup problem, whichis
quite resistant to solution in theabsence of either (a) betterinformation
at an earlier stage about patentslikely to issue, and/or (b) the abilityof
interested parties to challenge patentsat the PTO before they haveis-
sued and are given somepresumption of validity by the Courts.
Clearly, these concerns form the basisfor a serious discussion about
reform of the patent system.7However, my intention in this paperis to
explore how private companies canbest navigate the patent system we
currently have, and how ourantitrust laws can be enforcedin a way
that is sensitive to the transaction costsassociated with our current pat-
ent system. I see relativelylittle that private companies cando to over-
come the holdupproblem without reform of the patentsystem itself.
But there is quite a bit they cando to solve the complementsproblem,
which itself is greatly exacerbatedby the holdup problem.
Overlapping Patents and BusinessStrategy in Practice
To solve the complementsproblem generally, and to cutthrough the
patent thicket specifically,requires coordination amongrights holders.
Such coordination itself faces two typesof obstacles. First, there are in-
evitably coordination costs that mustbe overcome. Second, antitrust
sensitivities are invariablyheightened when companies in the same or
related lines of business combinetheir assets, jointly set feesof any
sort, or even talk directlywith one another. Because suchcoordinationNavigating the Patent Thicket
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may involve the elimination of competition,we have a complex inter-
action between private and public interests.Even as coordination be-
tween rights holders is critical, froma public policy perspective we
cannot presume that private dealsare in the public interest. Antitrust
authorities will legitimately wantto know whetherconsumers are
helped or harmed by anyarrangement; injured parties may seekre-
dress under the antitrust lawsor by alleging patent misuse.
Cross LicensesCross licenses commonlyare negotiated when each of
two companies has patents thatmay read on the other's products or
processes. Rather than blocking each other and goingto court or ceas-
ing production, the two enter intoa cross license. Especially with a roy-
alty free cross license, each firm is thenfree to compete, both in
designing its products without fear ofinfringement and in pricing its
products without the burden ofa per unit royalty due to the other.
Thus, cross licenses can solve thecomplements problem, at least
among two firms, and thus be highly procompetitive.
A cross license is simplyan agreement between two companies that
grants each the right to practice the other'spatents. Cross licenses may
or may not involve fixed fees or running royalties;running royalties
can in principle run in one directionor both. Cross licenses may in-
volve various field-of-use restrictionsor geographic restrictions. Cross
licenses may involve some butnot all relevant patents held by either
party; carve-outs are not uncommon. Andcross licenses, like regular li-
censes, may be confined to patents issued (or pending)as of the date of
the license, or they may includepatents to be granted througha certain
time in the future.
Patent Pools and Package Licenses Whentwo or more companiescon-
trol patents necessary to makea given product, and when at least some
actual or potential manufacturersmay not themselves hold any such
patents, a patent pool or a package licensecan be the natural solution
to the complements problem. Undera patent pool, an entire group of
patents is licensed in a package, either byone of the patent holders or
by a new entity established for thispurpose, usually to anyone willing
to pay the associated royalties. Undera package license, two or more
patent holders agree to the termson which they will jointly license
their complementary patents anddivide up the proceeds. A niceexam-
ple of a patent pool is the ManufacturersAircraft Association formed
in 1917 to license a number ofpatents necessary for the production ofShapiro
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airplanes, patents controlled by TheWright-Martin Aircraft Corpora-
tion, the Curtiss Aeroplane & MotorCorporation, and others.8 I discuss
below some more recent patentpools that have been used to help es-
tablish compatibility standards.
Cooperative Standard SettingThe need to solve the complementsprob-
lem tends to be especially greatin the context of standard setting.For
example, when the InternationalTelecommunications Union (ITU) es-
tablishes a new standard for faxtransmissions or modem protocols,the
participants are loath to agree to astandard that can be controlled by
any single firmthrough its patents. Thus, standardsetting organiza-
tions like the ITU or the AmericanNational Standards Institute (ANSI)
typically require that participants agree tolicense all patents essential
to compliance with anystandard on "fair, reasonable, andnondiscrimi-
natory" terms. Rules such as this areexplicitly intended to reduce or
eliminate any holdup problems.However, it is well to note that many
standard setting organizations are waryof sanctioning any specific
agreement regarding themagnitude of licensing terms for fear ofanti-
trust liability, as such agreementsmight be construed as price fixing.
Perversely, by leaving the precise licensingterms vague, this caution
can in fact lead to ex postholdup by particular rights holders, contrary
both to the goal of enabling innovationand to consumers' interests.
The case in which multiple firmscontrol patents essential to a stan-
dard fits well with the formal economicanalysis described above. In es-
sence, any manufacturerseeking to produce a compliantproduct must
obtain a license from each rightsholder to avoid facing an infringe-
ment action. Inventing aroundis typically impractical, as itwould pre-
clude the manufacturer from claimingthat its products are compliant
and thus assuring consumers thatthey are fully compatible with the
prevailing standard. Thus, standardsetting very often has especially
strong elements of boththe complements problem andthe holdup
problem.
Settlements of Patent DisputesCross licenses (or simply licenses) are a
common way in whichcompanies resolve patent disputes. Butother
forms of settlement arise, two ofwhich I touch on below. First, I discuss
acquisitions, in which one firmsimply acquires the other, thereby re-
solving the dispute and assemblingthe various intellectual property
rights within a single company.Second, I comment on cash payments
in exchange for exit, a strategywhereby one company pays the other
company to exit the market,and thus to drop its challenge tothe firstNavigating the Patent Thicket
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company's patent. In each of thesecases, legitimate questions ariseas
to whether any particular privateagreement truly is in the public
interest.
Antitrust Limits
As I have indicated,many of the business solutions to thecomplements
problem and the holdup problemraise antitrust issues. Quitegenerally,
agreements among companies that either docompete, or might com-
pete, directly with each other raiseantitrust warning flags. For each
business form, I consider belowits antitrust treatment.
Generally speaking,one can imagine two rather differentap-
proaches that antitrust might taketo firms' efforts to coordinateto
solve the complements problem.One approach is to ask whetherthe
agreement in question leads tomore competition than wouldoccur
without that agreement. This is theapproach advocated in the Depart-
ment of Justice and Federal Trade CommissionAntitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property,which state in §3.1 that:
However, antitrust concernsmay arise when a licensing arrangement harms
competition among entities that wouldhave been actual or likelypotential
competitors in a relevant market in the absenceof the license (entities ina "hor- izontal relationship").
Another quite different approachwould be to ask whether theagree-
ment in question is the mostcompetitive agreement possible. Put dif-
ferently, one could ask whethera given agreement isthe least
restrictive alternative that is workablein the sense of solving the legiti-
mate business problem faced, suchas unbiocking patent positions.
Clearly, this latter standard, whichdoes not reflect current antitrusten-
forcement policy according to theGuidelines, would be far tougheron
all forms of cooperationamong patent and copyright holders.
III.Cross Licensing
Cross Licenses and Design Freedom
Cross licenses are the preferredmeans by which large companies clear
blocking patent positionsamongst themselves. Based in parton work I
have done on behalf of Intel, Ican report that broad cross licensesare
the norm in markets for the designand manufacture of microproces-
sors.9 For example, Intel hasentered into a number of broadcross130
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licenses with other majorindustry participants, such asIBM, under
which most of each company'svast patent portfolio islicensed to the
other. Furthermore, the companiesgenerally agree to grant licenses to
each other for patents thatwill be issued several years intothe future,
typically for the lifetime of the crosslicensing agreement. Often,these
cross licensesinvolve no running royalties,although they may involve
balancing payments at the outset toreflect differences in the strengthof
the two companies' patentportfolios as reflected in a patentpageant,
and/or the vulnerability of each to aninfringement action by theother.
For example, Hewlett-Packardand Xerox recently announced a cross
license that settled theiroutstanding patent disputes.
From the perspective ofcompetition policy, cross licensesof this sort
are quite attractive.The traditional concern with crosslicenses among
competitors is that running royaltieswill be used as a device to elevate
prices and effect a cartel; seeKatz and Shapiro 1985. Clearly,such con-
cerns do not apply tolicenses that involve small or norunning royal-
ties, but rather have fixedup-front payments. Another concernis that
the granting of licenses tofuture patents will reduceeach company's in-
centive to innovate because itsrival will be able to imitate itsimprove-
ments.10 While correct in theoryit is clear, at least inthe case of
semiconductors and no doubt morewidely, that this concern is
dwarfed by the benefits arisingwhen each firm enjoys enhancedde-
sign freedom by virtue of its accessto the other firm's patentportfolio.
There is little doubt that thesebroad cross licenses permit the more
efficient use of engineers(arguably the resource that governsthe rate of
innovation in the semiconductorindustry), better products, and faster
product design cycles. In otherwords, when IBM and Intel sign afor-
ward looking cross license, eachis enabled to innovate morequickly
and more effectively withoutfear that the other will hold it upby as-
serting a patent that it hasunintentionally infringed. And neitherfirm
is really all that worried thatthe other will actually copy itsproducts,
just because the other has alicense to most of its patents.Of course, the
impressive rate of innovation inthe semiconductor industry inthe
presence of a web ofsuch cross licenses offers directempirical support
for the view that these crosslicenses promote rather thanstifle
innovation.
Intel's Policy of "IPfor IP"
Despite all of these benefits,the Federal Trade Commissionattacked
Intel's cross licensing practices in1998.11 One key episode behind theNavigating the Patent Thicket
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FTC's complaint involved Intel'sconduct when faced witha lawsuit by
Intergraph, a workstationmanufacturer, asserting that Intel'smicro-
processors infringed on certain patents held byIntergraph. Of course,
lawsuits like Intergraph'sare a necessary part of the threat point be-
hind any cross-licensingnegotiation: if one party is not happywith the
terms offered by the other, it alwayshas the option of initiatingpatent
litigation. In response toIntergraph's infringement actionagainst Intel,
Intel withdrew itsown intellectual property from Intergraph bysuing
Intergraph for infringement ofIntel's patents and by withdrawingthe
supply of Intel trade secretsto Intergraph, trade secrets thatIntergraph
valued highly for thepurposes of designing systems builton Intel
chips.
Evidently viewing Intel'sconduct as unfair, the FTCattempted to
fashion an antitrustcase against Intel based on this conduct, alongwith
a similar response by Intel toa lawsuit initiated by Digital Equipment
Corporation.12 The FTC actionagainst Intel sharply exposed the fact
that the FTC and Intel hadfundamentally different views aboutthe im-
pact of the conduct at issue. The FTCsaw Intel as using its existingmo-
nopoly power to fortify itsposition by lowering its royaltycosts per
chip and potentially offeringsuperior products by incorporatingtech-
nologies patented by others. Intelviewed itself as engaging ina defen-
sive exercise which wasa necessary aspect of cross licensing,namely
trading intellectual property forintellectual property (IP for IP)and
withdrawing its own intellectualproperty when faced witha frontal
assault on its core product line inthe form of an infringementaction
seeking injunctive relief. Intel,well aware of whata juicy target it
posed, believed it hadevery right to protect itself from holdup,and
certainly no duty to give specialtreatment in the form of Intel tradese-
crets and advance product samplesto a company attempting to hold
it up.
The problem for the FTCwas that the conduct at issue, especially
with respect to Intergraph,was directed at a customer of Intel's,not a
competitor. Brushing asideconcerns about holdup, and playing down
the important role ofcross licenses in the semiconductor industry,the
FTC found no "businessjustification" for Intel's conduct,and thus was
prepared to presume that the conductwas anticompetitive without ac-
tually studying the impactof the conduct on Intel'scompetitors. In
fact, Intel's true rivals inmicroprocessor design and manufacturing
(such as AMD, Motorola, Sun,or IBM) were either not subject to the
conduct at issue (since theywere not Intel customers at all and thusnot
recipients of the Intel tradesecrets at issue), or had ongoingcross132
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licenses with Intel underwhich the litigation triggeringthese episodes
would simply not occur in thefirst place.
Fortunately, a compromise wasreached and a settlement agreed to
between the FTC and Intel.'3In essence, Intel agreed not towithdraw
product information needed byits customers to build systemsbased
on soon-to-be-releasedIntel chips. (Presumably, thispromise provides
some benefit toIntel by assuring its customersthat they will not be held
up once they arerelying on Intel for their newsystems.) But Intel is not
obligated to continue to providetrade secrets on products fartherout
on their roadmap(i.e., products that will notbe introduced for a year
or two) to customerssuing Intel, and Intel was notobligated to provide
any trade secrets to a companysuing Intel and seeking a courtinjunc-
tion to shut down Intel's microprocessorbusiness.
The Intel situation also exposesthe interplay between government
enforcement of the antitrustlaws and private antitrustactions. Even
while the FTC was investigatingIntel, bringing a complaintagainst
Intel, and ultimately settlingwith Intel, Intergraph wasengaged in its
own antitrust andpatent battle with Intel.Intergraph won a resound-
ing victory in the firstround of that battle, in whichthe District Court
judge in Alabama issued asearing anti-Intel opinion ruling, among
other things, that Intel's microprocessorsand associated trade secrets
were "essentialfacilities" under antitrust laws,thus imposing a duty
on Intel to sell itsmicroprocessors toIntergraph and to make its trade
secrets available toIntergraph, Intergraph's lawsuitagainst Intel not-
withstanding. This opinion wasbased on strands of antitrustlaw that
require dominant companies todeal with their rivals, especiallyif the
dominant firm has established anongoing course of dealing withrivals
in the past.14
Ultimately, however, Intel wasvindicated. The District Court judge
later ruled that Intel was notin fact infringing onIntergraph's patents.
And, most significantly, theCourt of Appeals for theFederal Circuit
vacated the District Court's antitrustand essential facility opinion.'5 In
a stronglyworded and sweeping opinion, theappeals court ruled that
Intel's conduct did not violatethe antitrust laws because it wasnot di-
rected at a competitor andindeed could have no adverse impact on
competition in the market whereIntel was alleged to havemonopoly
power, namely themarket for microprocessors1 inwhich Intergraph
did not compete. The FTC'sefforts to fashion an antitrust caseout of
Intel's conduct look even moredubious now in the light of thissubse-
quent decision by the Courtof Appeals.Navigating the Patent Thicket
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The Intel episode is closely relatedto another ongoing debateregard-
ing the intersection betweenintellectual property rights andanti-
trust law: can a company violatethe antitrust laws simply byrefusing
to license its patents,or by refusing to sell patented items,to its ri-
vals? Most commentators havesaid for some time thata refusal to li-
cense patents cannot in and of itselfconstitute an antitrust violation.
However, the Supreme Courthas signaled that unilateralrefusals to sell can indeed constituteantitrust violations, especially ifa com-
pany has established an ongoingcourse of dealing with its rivals.16
The precise conditions underwhich a refusal to licensea patent (or to sell patented items)could constitute an antitrustviolation
has remained unclear. Mostobservers were stunned whenthe Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruledin 1997 that Kodakwas liable for
refusing to sell patentedspare parts for its machines to independent
service organizations seekingto compete against Kodak inthe
business of servicing Kodakcopiers and micrographicsequipment. As the Court acknowledged,this was the first timea unilateral
refusal to sell a patented item hadbeen judged to bean antitrust viola-
tion.17 Just recently, the Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuitcame to a very different conclusion,ruling that a company'sunilateral deci-
sion not to licensea patent (or sell a patented item) couldnever in and of itself constitutean antitrust violation.18 Hopefully, theSupreme
Court will resolve this significantsplit among the Circuit Courtsand
clarify that unilateral refusalsto license patents are immune fromanti- trust challenge.
Intel's practices, and those ofother firms who requiregrantbacks of
relevant patents in exchangefor a license to key enablingpatents,
copyrights, or trade secrets, raisesfurther interesting questionsabout
the role of self help in the digitaleconomy.19 One view of such business
strategies cum legal regimes is thatthey are a welcome effort by lead-
ing firms to establisha type of litigation-free zone likely to favorinno-
vation and get aroundsome of the current difficulties withour patent
system and the patent thicket itcauses. A less favorable view is that
these arrangementsrepresent efforts by powerful firmsto establish pri-
vate legal regimes that favorthemselves and make itmore difficult for
upstarts to challenge the dominanceof current market leaders. Isa
cross licensing policy of IP for IPa beneficial way to cut through the
patent thicket, or a strong-armtactic by a dominant firm thatenjoys
powerful patent rights and seeksaccess to others' intellectual property
in exchange?134
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IV.Patent Pools
A patent pool involves asingle entity (either a new entity or oneof the
original patent holders) that licensesthe patents of two or more compa-
nies to third parties as apackage. In many respects, apatent pool
(much like a package license) isthe purest solution to thecomplements
problem described above andanalyzed in the appendix. Indeed,licens-
ees may wellwelcome such a pool, bothfor the convenience of
one-stop shopping andbecause a subset of therequired patents may be
of little or no value bythemselves. Thus, from thelicensee's perspec-
tive, licensing the entirepackage is simpler and avoidsthe danger of
paying for some patent rightsthat turn out to be uselesswithout other
complementary rights.
Essential Patents vs. Rival Patents
The Department of Justice(DOJ) has clearly articulated itspolicy to-
ward patent pools/packagelicensing in a trio of businessreview letters
regarding an MPEG patent pooland two DVD patent pools.The es-
sence of thisapproach which precisely mirrorsthe economic princi-
ples articulated above, is thatinclusion of truly complementarypatents
in a patent pool is desirableand procompetitive butassembly of substi-
tute or rival patents in apool can eliminate competitionand lead to ele-
vated license fees. Butdifferently, the key distinction informing a
patent pool is that betweenblocking or essential patents,which properly
belong in the pool, and substitute orrival patents, which may need to re-
main separate.
In the MPEG case,2° the Departmentapproved the creation of a pool
of patents necessary toenable manufacturers to meetthe MPEG-2
video compression technology.This pool, encompassing patentsfrom
Fujitsu, General Instrument,Lucent, Matsushita,Mitsubishi, Philips,
Scientific-Atlanta, Sony, andColumbia University, permits one-stop
shopping for makers of televisions,digital video disks and players,and
telecommunications equipment aswell as cable, satellite, andbroad-
cast television services.To support their formationof a patent pool,
these nine patent holdersconducted an extensive search toidentify all
patents essential to theMPEG-2 standard and includethem in the pool.
The licensing agent for thepool, MPEG LA, will employ anindepend-
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essential, and whether other patentsas well are essential and thus suit-
able for inclusion in the pool. As statedby the Department, "theuse of
the independent-expert mechanism willhelp ensure that the portfolio
will contain only patents thatare truly essential to the MPEG-2 stan-
dard, weeding out patents thatare competitive alternatives to each
other."
In the first Digital Versatile Disk (DVD)case,21 the Departmentap-
proved a proposal by Philips, Sony,and Pioneer to jointly license pat-
ents necessary to make discs and playersthat comply with the
DVD-Video and DVD-ROM standards.Again, only essential patents
are to be included in the joint licensingprogram. As with the earlier CD
licensing program of Sony andPhilips, licenses will be offered by
Philips, in this case on behalf of allthree firms. Again, an independent
patent expert will be employed toensure that the license only conveys
the rights to essential patents. As statedby the Department, "the expert
will help ensure that the patent pooldoes not combine patents that
would otherwise be competing with each other."The Department sub-
sequently approved a second joint licensingscheme relating to the
D\TDVideo and DVD-ROM standards,22this one including patents
held by Toshiba (the licensing entity),Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi,
Time Warner, and Victor Company ofJapan. Note that the effect of
these two patent poolsappears to be to reduce but not eliminate the
complements problem, since there remaintwo separate pools, not just
one: two-stop shopping, it would appear.
A Patent Pool Created to Resolve Claimsof Blocking Patents
In contrast to the Department of Justice'sapproval of these three patent
pools, the Federal Trade Commission inMarch 1998 challengeda pat-
ent pooi formed by Summit Technology, Inc.and VisX, Inc., two firms
that manufacture and market lasersto perform a new, and increasingly
popular, vision correctingeye surgery, photorefractive keratectomy.23
According to the FTC: "Instead ofcompeting with each other, the firms
placed their competing patents ina patent pool and share the proceeds
each and every time a Summitor VISX laser is used." The FTC was os-
tensibly following the same principles employedby the Justice Depart-
ment, namely to permit the assembly ofcomplementary or essential
patents, but not rival patents, intoa pool. According to the FTC,
the two companies agreed not to licensetheir patents independently.Shapiro
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However, the companies in this caseargued vigorously that they did
indeed have mutually blocking patents,making their pool, Pillar Point
Partners, procompetitive. In August1998 the two companies settled
with the FTC and agreed to lift anyrestrictions on each other regarding
the licensing of their patents;ultimately, their patent pool was
dissolved.24
The Summit and VisX case raises anumber of very interesting and
tricky issues regarding patent poolsand joint licensing programs in
general. First, if two companiesreasonably believed that their patents
blocked each other at the time theyformed the pool, was that sufficient
to justify the formationof a pool? How hard are they required tolook
into the validity of each other'sclaims before agreeing to pool their
patents? Second, if each firm believedit could, at considerable expense,
delay, and risk, invent around theother's patents, should the two firms
be prohibited from forming apool and rather forced to attempt to in-
vent around each other's patents,under the view that consumers might
thereby enjoy the benefits of directcompetition (although the product
might be delayed, or neverintroduced, in the absence of the pool)?
Third, is there competitive harm inplacing some potentially rival pat-
ents into the pool, assuming thateach party in fact controls valid block-
ing patents, making some typeof pool procompetitive? Fourth, canthe
pool be attacked on antitrust groundsbased on the argument that a less
restrictive alternative, namely a crosslicense, would have achieved the
same legitimate purposesand created additional ex postcompetition? If
so, does it matter inthis assessment if the two companies agreethat the
pool will license their patents tothird parties, something that a cross
license would not permit, unlessit contained rather unusual sub-
licensing rights?
V.Cooperative Standard Setting
Blocking patents are especially commonin the context of standard set-
ting: once a standard is picked, anypatents (or copyrights) necessary to
comply with that standard becometruly essential. If the standard be-
comes popular, each suchpatent can confer significantmarket power
on its owner, and thestandard itself is subject to holdup if thesepatent
holders are not somehow obligated tolicense their patents on reason-
able terms. As noted above, forprecisely this reason, standard setting
bodies require participants to license anyessential patents on reason-
able terms as a quid pro quo beforeadopting any standards.25Navigating the Patent Thicket
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Fortunately, antitrustconcerns have not prevented a greatmany co-
operative standard setting efforts fromproceeding forward. Somepar-
ticipants go so far as tosay that much of the innovation taking place
now in the telecommunications, Internet,and computer areas is stan-
dards based. Indeed,even the fiercest enemies often teamup in the
software industry to promotenew standards. Back in 1997, Microsoft
and Netscape, two companieshardly known as cozypartners, agreed
to include compatible versions ofVirtual Reality Modeling Language
(developed by Silicon Graphics)in their browsers. Thisagreement was
expected to make it far easier forconsumers to view 3D images on the
Web. Earlier, Microsoft agreedto support the Open Profiling Standard,
which permits users of personalcomputers to control what personal
information is disclosed toa particular web site, and which had previ-
ously been advanced by Netscape,along with Firefly Network, Inc.
and Verisign Inc.
But neither is cooperativestandard setting immune fromantitrust
scrutiny. In the consumer electronicsarea, for example, the Justice De-
partment investigated Sony, Philips, andothers regarding the estab-
lishment of the CD standard inthe 1980s. Cooperative effortsto set
optical disc standards have also beenchallenged in private antitrust
cases, on the theory that agreements to adhereto a standard are an un-
reasonable restraint of trade:
Edlefendants have agreed, combined,and conspired to eliminate competition
. by agreeing not to compete in the design of formats forcompact discs and
compact disc players, and by instead agreeingto establish, and establishing,a common format and design.
Does cooperation lead to efficientstandardization, increasedcompe- tition, and additionalconsumer benefits? Or is cooperative standard
setting a means for firms collectivelyto stifle competition, to the detri-
ment of consumers and firms not includedin the standard setting
group? Answering these questionsand evaluating the limits that
should be placed on cooperativestandard setting efforts requirean
analysis of the competitive effectsof such cooperation incomparison
with some reasonable but-forworld. Inevitably, an antitrust analysisof
cooperative standard setting involvesan assessment of how the market
would likely evolve without thecooperation. One possibility is that
multiple, incompatible productswould prevail in the market, ifnot for
the cooperation. Anotherpossibility is that the market wouldeventu-
ally tip to a single product,even without cooperation. Even in this138
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latter case, an initialindustrywide standard can havesignificant
efficiency and welfare consequences,for three reasons: (1) cooperation
may lock in adifferent product design thanwould emerge from com-
petition; (2) cooperation mayeliminate a standards war wagedprior to
tipping; and (3) cooperation islikely to enable multiple firms tosupply
the industry standard product,whereas a standards war maylead to a
single, proprietary product.
The Costs and Benefits ofCompatibility and Standards
There are significant benefitsassociated with achieving compatibility
These include:
successful launching of a bandwagon ornetwork,
greater realization ofnetwork effects,
protecting buyers from stranding,and
enabling competition within an openstandard.
Likewise, standardization andcompatibility can impose very real
costs on consumers:
constraints on variety and innovation,
loss of ex ante competition towin the market, and
proprietary control over a closedstandard.
Legal Treatment of CooperativeStandard Setting
I now look more closely atthe intellectual property issuesthat arise
specifically in the context ofstandard setting, where the participants
typically agree to license their patents onfair, reasonable, and nondis-
criminatory terms.
Firms are sometimes accusedof hiding intellectual propertyrights
until after the proprietarytechnology has been embedded in aformal
standard. I view this issue primarily as oneof contract law. Standard
setting groups typically haveprovisions in their charterscompelling
participants either to reveal allrelevant intellectual property rights or
to commit to licensing anyintellectual property rights embedded inthe
standard on reasonable terms.27Clearly these rules help controlthe
holdup problem. In some cases,however, the precise requirements im-
posed by a standard setting group maybe unclear. In these circum-
stances, if the standardaffects nonparticipants, including consumers,Navigating the Patent Thicket
139
there is a public interest inclarifying the duties imposedon partici-
pants in a fashion that promotesrather than stifles competition.
The question of whether firmsshould be allowed,or even encour-
aged, to set standardscooperatively is part of the broaderissue of col-
laboration amongcompetitors, a storied area within antitrustlaw. Most of the case law deals withquality and performancestandards rather
than compatibility standards.28Existing cases also have tendedto focus
on the standard setting process itself, ratherthan the outcomes ofcoop- erative standard setting.
Antitrust liability has been foundfor participants ina standard set-
ting process who abuse thatprocess to exclude competitors from the
market. One leadingcase is Allied Tube & Conduit Corp.v. Indian Head,
Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988), inwhich the Supreme Courtaffirmed a jury
verdict against a group ofmanufacturers of steel conduit for electrical
cable. These manufacturersconspired to block an amendmentof the
National Electric Code thatwould have permitted theuse of plastic
conduit. They achieved this bypacking the annual meetingof the Na-
tional Fire Protection Association,whose model code is widely
adopted by state and localgovernments. The other leadingcase is
American Society of MechanicalEngineers v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456U.S. 556
(1982), in which the SupremeCourt affirmed an antitrustjudgment
against a trade association. In thiscase, the chairman of an association
subcommittee offered an unofficialruling that the plaintiff'sproduct
was unsafe, and this rulingwas used by the plaintiff's rival (whoen- joyed representationon the subcommittee) to discouragecustomers from buying the plaintiff'sproduct.
Antitrust risks associated withexcluding a rival from the marketap-
pear to be less of a problem foran open standard, but could arise if
the companies promotingthe standard block others fromadhering
to the standard or seek royaltiesfrom outsiders. The DOJbusiness re-
view letters regarding the MPEG-2,DVD-Video, and DVD-ROMstan-
dards are excellent illustrationsof how the enforcementagencies can
successfully handle intellectualproperty in the standard setting
context.
As the Supreme Court hasnoted, "Agreementon a product standard
is, after all, implicitlyan agreement not to manufacture,distribute, or
purchase certain types ofproducts."29 To date, thistype of reasoning
has not been used to imposeper se liability on software standardset-
ting activities. Indeed, I knowof no successful antitrustchallenges
to cooperation to set compatibilitystandards. The closestcase of which
I am aware is AddamaxCorporation v. Open SoftwareFoundation, Inc.,140
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888 F. Supp. 274 (1995). InAddamax, the District Courtrefused to
grant summary judgment onbehalf of the Open SoftwareFoundation,
an industryconsortium formed todevelop a platform-indepen-
dent version of the UNIXoperating system. OSF conducted abid-
ding to select a supplierof security software. Afterfailing to be se-
lected, Addamax broughtantitrust claims againstOSF, Hewlett-
Packard, and Digital EquipmentCorporation, asserting thatOSF
had chosen the winner notbased on the merits but to favorspecific
companies and technologies.The Addamax case looksproblematic,
inasmuch as the primary purposeof OSF was to permit itsmembers
to team up to offer strongercompetition against the leadingUNIX
vendors, Sun Microsystemsand AT&T, and there was noevidence
suggesting that OSF's failure topick Addamax was based onits
members desire to controlthe market in which Addamaxitself
operated.
Ultimately, the antitrust risksfaced by companies that are tryingto
set compatibilitystandards appear to be relativelyminor as long as the
scope of the agreementtruly is limited to standardsetting and steers
clear of distribution, marketing,and pricing. While the lawhas typi-
cally looked for integrationand risk-sharing amongcollaborators in or-
der to classify cooperation as ajoint venture and escape per se
condemnation, these are not veryhelpful screens for standard setting
activities. The essence ofcooperative standard, setting is notthe sharing
of risks associated withspecific investments, or theintegration of oper-
ations, but rather the contributionof complementaryintellectual prop-
erty rights and theexpression of unified support toignite positive
feedback for a new technology.
The limits imposed by publicpolicy in the area ofcompatibility stan-
dards remain unclear. The mostspecific statement by the antitrust en-
forcement agencies can befound in a recent FTC StaffReport.3° The
Staff Report recognized a needfor clarification in this area:
the time has come for a significanteffort to rationalize, simplifyand articulate
in one document the antitruststandards that federal enforcerswill apply in as-
sessing collaborations amongcompetitors. This effort should bedirected at
drafting and promulgating"competitor collaboration guidelines"that would
be applicable to a wide varietyof industry settings and flexibleenough to ap-
ply sensibly asindustries continue rapidly to innovateand evolve.3'
Since that call for action,the FTC has conductedJoint Venture
Hearings, and the Commissionand the Antitrust Divisionissued inNavigating the Patent Thicket
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April 2000 new "AntitrustGuidelines for CollaborationsAmong Com-
petitors" (available at eitherAgency's web site).
Hidden Patents and Holdupin Standard Setting
A number of disputes havesurfaced recently that illustratethe thorny
problems associated with hiddenpatent rights that were laterexerted
against established standards.32
Dell Computer and the VESAVL-Bus StandardThe leading U.S.exam- ple of this type of antitrustaction is the FTC's consentagreement with Dell Computer Corporation,announced in November 1995.Although the case involvedcomputer hardware, it is important forthe software
community as well. The assertionwas that Dell threatened to exercise
undisclosed patent rights againstcomputer companies adopting the
VL-bus standard,a mechanism to transfer datainstructions between
the computer's CPU and itsperipherals such as the hard diskdrive or
the display screen. The VL-buswas used in 486 chips, but it hasnow
been supplanted by the PCIbus. According to the FTC.
During the standard-settingprocess, VESA [Video Electronics StandardAsso- ciationj asked its members tocertify whether they hadany patents, trade- marks, or copyrights that conflictedwith the proposed VL-busstandard; Dell certified that it hadno such intellectual property rights. AfterVESA adopted the standardbased inpart, on Dell's certificationDellsought to enforce its
patent against firms planning to followthe standard.33
There are twocontroversial issues surrounding thisconsent decree:
(a) the FTC did not assert thatDell acquired marketpower, and indeed
the VL-bus neverwas successful; and (b) the FTC didnot assert that DellintentionallymisledVESA. My analysissuggeststhat
anticompetitive harm is unlikely toarise in the absence of significant
market power and that thecompetitive effects are not dependenton Dell's intentions.
Motorola and the IT1I V34 ModemStandardAnother good example of
how competitioncan be affected when standardsetting organizations
impose ambiguous dutieson participants is the case of Motorolaand the V.34 modem standardadopted by the InternationalTelecommuni-
cations Union. Motorola agreedto license its patents essentialto the
standard case to allcomers on "fair, reasonable, andnondiscriminatory142
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terms."34 Once the standard wasin place, Motorolathen made offers
that some industry participantsdid not regard as meetingthis obliga-
tion. Litigation ensuedbetween Rockwell andMotorola, in part over
the question of whetherreasonable terms should mean:(a) the terms
that Motorola could haveobtained ex ante, in competitionwith other
technology that could havebeen placed in thestandard; or (b) the
terms that Motorolacould extract ex post, giventhat the standard is set
and Motorola's patents areessential to that standard.
These issues are best dealtwith by the standard settingbodies, or
standard setting participantseither by making more explicitthe duties
imposed on participants1 orby encouraging ex antecompetition
among differentholders of intellectual propertyrights to get their
property into the standard.Unfortunately, antitrust concernshave led
at least some of thesebodies to steer clear of such exante competition,
on the groundsthat their job is merely to settechnical standards, not to
get involved in prices,including the terms onwhich intellectual prop-
erty will be madeavailable to other participants.The ironic result has
been to embolden somecompanies to seek substantialroyalties after
participating in formalstandard setting activities.
VI.Settlements of Patent Disputes
Cross licenses and patentpools can be ways to settleintellectual prop-
erty disputes. For example,the Summit and VisX patentpool discussed
above, Pillar Point Partners, wasessentially a settlement of a patent
dispute between Summitand VisX.
Generally speaking, antitrustauthorities have legitimate concerns
that parties will settle theirintellectual property disputes in waysthat
stifle competition. As a matterof economic theory there is no reasonto
expect the two parties'collective interests in settlement,and especially
in the form of any settlementthey adopt, to coincidewith the public in-
terest, which includes consumerinterests. So, while thelaw surely wel-
comes the settlementof disputes generally,and does not seek to force
parties to litigate to thedeath, some settlements canbe anticompetitiVe.
Based on this general view,Assistant Attorney Generalfor Antitrust
Joel Klein recentlysuggested (see Klein 1997) thatparties notify the
Justice Department of certainsettlements that they enter into,much as
parties are required tonotify the Justice Departmentand the FTC in ad-
vance of their intentionto merge.Navigating the Patent Thicket
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Firms are quite creative incrafting settlements ofintellectual prop- erty disputes, and byno means restrict their attentionto cross licenses and patent pools. Forexample, one tried andtrue method of settlinga dispute is for thecompanies involved simply tomerge. However, the antitrust authoritiesare well aware that suchmergers can themselves
eliminate competition, andthey will view suchmergers with skepti-
cism if there is a good chancethat the two parties will infact be capable
of competing against eachother, their patent claimsnotwithstanding. A good example of sucha merger that was modified inresponse to FTC concerns was the proposedmerger of Boston Scientific and CVISin the area of imaging catheters.5 An interestingtwist in such cases is that the
parties' posturing in court,where they each havean incentive to assert that they are not infringingon the other's patents, providesdirect am- munition to the FTC or DOJto assert that the twocompanies could in- deed compete independentlyif not for themerger.
A second method thatcompanies can use to settlea patent dispute is for one company to simplypay the other company to drop itsclaims and exit the market. Suchagreements raise obvious antitrustconcerns, because an incumbent firmmay be willing to pay handsomelyto elimi- nate a potential competitor andavoid the risk of having itspatent chal- lenged, especially ifno equally effective challengeris likely to arriveon the scene any timesoon. The losers in such dealscan easily be subse-
quent would-be entrants (if thepatent were struck down)or consum- ers (who would benefit froma finding that the patent at issue isinvalid or not infringed). Put differently,a settlement can generate negativeex- ternalities, either to other firmsor to consumers, and thus there isa le- gitimate role of the Courtsand the antitrustenforcement agencies to oversee such settlements.
One class of settlementsthat are suspiciouson their face is that in-
volving agreements betweenincumbent manufacturersof branded pharmaceuticals and would-berivals who seek to offergeneric compe- tition by challenging thevalidity of the patentsunderlying the branded
product's dominant position.It has been reportedrecently that the FTC is consideringchallenging several suchsettlements.36 Thesecases have an interesting twistresulting from the fact thatcertain generic
manufacturers can gain preferentialrights to enter the marketbefore others are permitted to doso. As a result, the brandedmanufacturer may be able to stall competitionby entering intoa suitable agree- ment with the uniquely-placedgeneric manufacturer, knowingthat144
subsequent rivals willface some delay. Inorder to identify and
prevent any anticompetitiveagreements of this nature,the FTC has
asked that the FDA requirecompanies to notify the FDAof any such
settlements and make thatinformation available tothe FTC for its
review.
vii.Conclusions
Our current patent systemis causing a potentiallydangerous situation
in several fields,including biotechnology,semiconductors, computer
software, and e-commerce,in which a would-be entrepreneuror inno-
vator may face a barrageof infringement actions thatit must overcome
to bring its product orservice to market. In otherwords, we are in dan-
ger of creatingsignificant transaction costsfor those seeking to com-
mercialize new technologybased on multiple patents,overlapping
rights, and holdup problems.Under these circumstances,it is fair to
ask whether the pendulumhas swung too far inthe direction of
strong patent rights,ranging from the standardsused at the Patent and
Trademark Office for approvingpatent applications1 tothe secrecy
of such app1ication5 tothe presumption affordedby the courts to pat-
ent validity to theright of patent holders toseek injunctive relief by in-
sisting that infringingfirms cease productionof the offending
products.
Under these circumstances, we canill afford to further raise transac-
tion costs by making itdifficult for patenteespossessing complemen-
tary and potentiallyblocking patents to coordinateto engage in cross
licensing, package licensing, orto form patent pools.Yet antitrust law
can potentiallyplay such a counterproductiverole, especially since an-
titrust jurisprudence startswith a hostility towardcooperation among
horizontal rivals.
So far, the Departmentof Justice has displayed akeen understanding
of the need for thoseholding complementaryrights to coordinate in
the licensing of thoserights, but the FederalTrade Commission has ex-
hibited less restraint, andarguably is making it moredifficult for firms
to engage in crosslicenses, to offer packagelicenses, or to form
procompetitiVe patent pools.Many of these issues arelikely to be ex-
tremely important in the nearfuture, especially withthe rise of stan-
dard setting as anessential part of the processby which new
technologies are commercialized.
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Notes
Prepared for presentation at "InnovationPolicy and the Economy," NationalBureau of Economic Research, Adam Jaffe,Joshua Lerner, and Scott Stern,organizers, April 11, 2000, Washington DC. Commentsare welcomed; please direct anycomments to shapiro@haas.berkeley.edu.
For example, in 1995 Joseph Stiglitz,then Chairman of the Council of EconomicAdvi- sors, stated at the opening of the Federal TradeCommission's hearings on Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, GlobalMarketplace, that "some people jump... to the con- clusion that the broader the patent rightsare, the better it is for innovation, and that isn't
always correct, because we havean innovation system in which one innovationbuilds on another. If you get monopoly rights downat the bottom, you may stifle competitionthat uses those patents later on and so... the breadth and utilization of patent rights can be
used not only to stifle competition, but alsohave adverse effects in the longrun on inno- vation." See FFC Staff Report,p. 6.
Seehttp://www.amazoncom/exec/obidos/subst/mi/tthl/lO 5496631.
Nearly 5,000 patents were granted inthe U.S. in a recent singleyear, 1998, relating to
microprocessors alone, not to mentionsemiconductors more broadly.
See, for example, Kortum and Lerner1998, Cohen et al. 2000, and Hall andHam 1999.
For a brief description of Cournot'soriginal work on complements, andmodern extensions, see Shapiro 1989,p. 339.
Cournot assumed that the two inputs,copper and zinc, were required in certain fixed
proportions for the production of brass. Ifone input can be substituted for the other, they
have properties of substitutesas well as complements, in which case competitionbetween the two input owners cango far to solving the problem posed here. Throughoutthis pa- per, I am assuming that the company in questionrequires rights to practice each ofsev- eral patents, and that one patent licensecannot substitute for another. Clearly, to theex- tent that a manufacturer, for example,can rely on multiple designs or production
processes covered by separate patents withseparate owners, the patent thicket is far less of a problem. But even in thisrelatively friendly setting, extra difficultiescan still be raised by the holdup problem, discussedbelow.
For a thoughtful discussion ofpossible reforms at the Patent and TrademarkOffice, see Merges 1999.
See Klein 1997 for a further descriptionof this pool and how it operated. Inthis case, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, FranklinD. Roosevelt, had to leanon the industry to form a pool and help enable wartimeproduction of aircraft.
See Hall and Ham 1999 and Grindleyand Teece 1997 for additional studiesof licens- ing practices in the semiconductor industry.
This concern about discouraginginnovation also arises with respectto grantbacks, under which one company agreesto license its future patents in exchangefor rights to use an existing patent held by anothercompany. See Gilbert and Shapiro 1997 fora fur- ther discussion of grantbacks.
In the matter of Intel Corporation, DocketNo. 9288, Complaint filed June 8, 1998.The146
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Complaint is available at
http://wwW.ftC.gOv/0s/1998/9806/mteffmncmPtm I was
retained by Intel to work on this matter.
For one well-informed articulationof the theory underlying the FTC'sposition, see
Baker 1999.
For more information on the settlementbetween the FTC and Intel,see
http://ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/d09288mtelagementhtm
The key recent Supreme Court case hereis Aspen Skiing Company v. AspenHighlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985),although the essential facilities doctrine goesback to the
case of U.S. v. TerminalRailroad Association of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383(1912).
Intergraph Corporation v. Intel Corporation,United States Court of Appeals for theFed-
eral Circuit, 98-1308, Decided November5, 1999, Judge Newman writing theopinion for
the Court.
The classic cites are Otter Tail Power Co. v.U.S., 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (duty to sellwhole-
sale electric power to a retailcompetitor) and Aspen Skiing Company v. AspenHighlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), (duty tocontinue to offer a joint lift ticket with arival ski
slope).
The Court set up a tortured standardunder which a company's decision torefuse to
license its patent was "presumptivelyvalid," but could be overcome byevidence that the
company's intent was anticompetitive.Of course, asserting intellectual propertyrights
against a would-be rival is typicallyanticompetitive in the sense of trying toeliminate a
competitor (or at least earn royalties fromthe competitor, which add to thecompetitor's
costs), so this test is not in fact workable.Amazingly, the Court said that Kodak wouldbe
justified in refusing to sell patented partsif its intent was to earn a return on itsR&D in-
vestment required to design andmanufacture those parts, but not if its intent wasto
eliminate competitors who rely on those verypatented parts. I testified on behalf of Ko-
dak in this case.
United States Court of Appeals for theFederal Circuit, 99-1323, In Re Independent
Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation,CSU, et. al. v. Xerox Corporation,Decided Febru-
ary 17, 2000, Judge Mayerwriting the opinion.
For a discussion of self help focusing oncopyright holders, see Dam 1998.
See the June 26, 1997 press release athttp://www.usdOj/g0v/atr/Pud/P155_
releases/1997/1173.htm.
See the December 17, 1998 pressrelease athttp://www.u5doj.gOv/afr/Pd/
press_releases/1998/2l20htm.
See the June 10, 1999 business reviewletter at http://wwW.u5dOj.g0v/atr/Pd/
pressjeleases/1999/2484.htm
See the March 24, 1998 pressrelease athttp://www.ftc.gOv/opa/1998/98031'
eye.htm.
For a description of the settlement, seethe August 21, 1998 press release at
http: / /www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9808/5umw5x.htm.
Despite this settlement, the FTC
continued to pursue VisX for allegedlyacquiring a key patent by inequitableconduct
and fraud by omission on the U.S.Patent and Trademark Office. However, anadminis-
trative law judge subsequentlydismissed this complaint; see the June 4, 1999 press re-
lease at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9906/w5tm.Navigating the Patent Thicket 147
Note that these rules can create the perverse incentive for patent holders to assert
that at least some of their patents are not in fact essential, but perhaps merely extremely
helpful, in complying with the standard. By this device, a patent holdercan in principle
either refuse to license its patent to others (especially once the standard has becomees-
tablished, and perhaps for a patent that issued after the standard is established)or seek
something more than fair and reasonable royalties. Of course, whether the terms fair and
reasonable are evaluated on an ex ante or ex post basis is not precisely clear, although the
terms would have little force if applied only on an ex post basis.
"Second Amended Complaint," Disctronics Texas, Inc., et al. v. Pioneer Electronic Corp.
et al. Eastern District of Texas, Case No. 4:95 CV 229, filed August 2, 1996 at 12.
Note that a company might profit from refusing to participate in the standard setting
process, in the hope that the resulting standard will nonetheless (perhaps inadvertently)
infringe on the company's patent. Then the company would not be obligated to license
its blocking patent on fair and reasonable terms, if at all. This would at least create the
possibility that the company in question could control the standard and make it propri-
etary once it became established.
See Anton and Yao 1995 for a more complete discussion of the legal treatment ofper-
formance standards.
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,500 (1988).
Federal Trade Commission. 1996, June. "Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition
Policy in the New High-Tech Global Marketplace," Chapter 9, "Networks and Stan-
dards."
ibid, Chapter 10, "Joint Ventures," at 17.
There are many more examples of disputes involving hidden patent rights andstan-
dard setting, including: Wang vs. Mitsubishi; Microsoft and Cascading Style Sheets; and
ETSI and Third-Generation Mobile Telephones.
See http://www.ftc.gov/opa/9606/dell2.htm.
I served as an expert in this matter retained by Rockwell; the views stated here do not
necessarily reflect those of any party to the case.
See the May 3,1995 press release at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/9505/
boscvis.htm. The recent merger of Gemstar and TV Guide is another example ofa
merger/settlement that raises antitrust issues.
One episode under investigation involves Abbott Laboratories, Novartis's Geneva
Pharmaceuticals unit, and the popular hypertension drug, Hytrin. Another episode in-
volves Aventis(the new company formed from the merger of Hoechst and
Rhone-Poulenc), Andrx, and the heart drug Cardizem CD. Abbott reportedly agreed to
pay Geneva $4.5 million per month to delay the launch of a generic version of Hytrin.
Abbott asserts that its agreement with Geneva is "in accordance with all laws." See the
Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2000, "FTC Panel Backs Suit Against Abbott, Novartison
Deal for Hypertension Drug," p. B20. See the FTC website for updates.
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Technical Appendix
Here I show that prices can be well abovemonopoly levels if multiple
firms have critical patents, all of which readon a single product. More
precisely, if N firms each controla patent that is essential for the pro-
duction of a given product, and if these N firmsindependently set their
licensing fees, the resulting markupon that product is N times the mo-
nopoly markup.
Suppose that N firms, i = 1,... , N, each own a patent that is essential
to the production of a given product. For simplicity letus think of there
being a competitive industry that produces thisproduct, buying and
assembling the necessary components from each ofthese N firms. For
this purpose we can think of firm i eitheras setting a license fee for the
use of its patent, or as setting a price at which it will sell itsessential
component to the competitive assembly industry; the theoryis identi-
cal either way.
The cost to firm i per unit (for making and sellingits component or
for licensing its patent to assemblers) is denotedby c. The price of
component i (or the license fee charged by firm i) is denoted byp. The
price of the product itself is denoted byp. In addition to paying royal-
ties (or buying components), the assembly firmsincur an assembly
cost per unit eual to a. Competition at the "assembly" levelensures
that p = a +L=1p.
Demand for the product in question is denoted byD(p). The absolute
value of the elasticity of demand is given byE =D'(p)p/D(p). In gen-
eral,will vary with p.
I assume that the N firms set theircomponent prices, equivalently
their license fees, independently andnoncooperatively. In other words,
I look for the Nash Equilibrium in the pricesri,. ..PN. The profits for
firm i are given by
George Mason Law Review
Strategic Guide to the Network
1995, April. Antitrust Guide-
2000, April. Antitrust Guide-150 Shapiro
'rr = D(p)(p1 - c1).
The first-order condition for firm i is givenby
=D(p)+D'(p)(p c)=O.
Adding up across all i gives
D(p)N+D'(p)(p c1)=O.
which can be rewritten as
N' c ' D(I' '''="' N.
p pD'(p)
Using the definition of the elasticity ofdemand, and the fact that
p we have
p - (a
+
c)
N (1)
In other words, the percentage markup overcost for the product in
question is equal to N times the inverse of theelasticity of demand. In
contrast, the standard monopoly markuprule would be
p - (a
±
c)
(2)
The markup with N independent firmscontrolling key patents is
equal to N times the monopoly markup.
It can be shown that the combined profitsof the N firms under inde-
pendent pricing is lower than would be earnedby a monopolist selling
all N components. This implies that the firmshave an incentive to coor-
dinate their pricing. A package licensefor all N components would
lead to higher (combined) profits and lower pricesfor consumers.